AL-QAEDA AS AN ADVERSARY: Do We Understand Our Enemy

AL-QAEDA AS AN ADVERSARY: Do We Understand Our Enemy?

Daniel L Byman. World Politics. Baltimore: Oct 2003.Vol.56, Iss. 1; pg. 139, 25 pgs

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Subjects: Terrorism, Radical groups, Suicide bombings, Muslims, National security, International relations-US

People: Bin Laden, Osama

Companies: Al Qaeda (NAICS: 813940 )

Author(s): Daniel L Byman

Document types: Feature

Publication title: World Politics. Baltimore: Oct 2003. Vol. 56, Iss. 1; pg. 139, 25 pgs

Source type: Periodical

ISSN/ISBN: 00438871

ProQuest document ID: 629641901

Text Word Count 11000

Document URL: http://proquest.umi.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/pqdlink?did=629641901&sid=8&Fmt=3&clientId=12520&RQT=309&VName=PQD

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Abstract (Document Summary)

Byman discusses the goals, organizational structure, and weaknesses of the al-Qaeda terrorist network by addressing several current books on the subject. The authors of the books contend that radical Islam appears to be thriving, although the efforts to stop the organization's leadership may be going extremely well and that further attacks are likely and may even be inevitable, but ignores several positive signs, including the alienation of more Muslims from the bloody tactics of terrorists, rather than attracting them. He concludes by recommending several policies based on the assessment of al-Qaeda as an adversary.

Full Text (11000 words)

AL-QAEDA'S devastating strikes on two World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, were more than murderous blows that cost almost three thousand lives and billions in economic damage.1 For many Americans, the attacks shattered a complacency built up over more than a decade of peace and prosperity. As journalist Peter Bergen notes, "Suddenly, the blithe days of dot-com billionaires, Puff Daddy's legal problems, and Gary Condit's evasions about the missing Chandra Levy had disappeared like a delightful mirage" (p. 226). A menacing, bizarre, and seemingly overwhelming foe had arisen out of nowhere to threaten the country in an unprecedented way.

The questions began well before the shock wore off. Who was Osama bin Laden, and what did he want? How could his bedraggled fighters carry out so devastating an attack? Why was America the target of the killers' rage? Is the enemy a small band of killers, a larger group of radicals, or even the entire Islamic world itself? Is this a war to the death, threatening everything the United States (or civilization) holds dear? And, most importantly, what can be done to counter these deadly foes?

These questions provoked a heated debate. Experts disputed both the size and the appeal of al-Qaeda, making it unclear whether it is a small fringe movement or a cohesive network. Terrorism specialists warn that al-Qaeda's ideology is attractive and spreading, while leading scholars of political Islam such as Gilles Kepel and his mentor, Olivier Roy, see political Islam as on the decline.2 Bin Ladens importance was also questioned, with some arguing that he was the charismatic leader and chief financier of al-Qaeda and others saying he was only one leader among many. Most fundamentally, the scale of the threat is in dispute. Many observers see the struggle between the United States and al-Qaeda as "World War IV," while other experts caution that the September 11 attacks may be an anomaly.3

Effective policy hinges on the answers to these questions. Judging whether counterterrorism measures are succeeding or failing is almost impossible when we do not know the enemy's strength, level of popular support, or overall objectives. Resource allocation, counterterrorism legislation, and the necessary infringement, if any, of civil liberties all hinge on the nature and extent of the danger.

Concerned Americans who turned to the academy to learn about al-Qaeda came away empty-handed. The September 11 attacks surprised academics even more than they did experts in government and in think tanks. As a result, scholars have so far offered few substantial studies to inform the public and policymakers.4 Such surprise is not surprising, as the study of terrorism has historically been a backwater at American academic institutions. As Audrey Kurth Cronin laments, "A principal interest in terrorism virtually guarantees exclusion from consideration from most academic positions."5

This vacuum is now being filled-but not by American academics. Several recently published books on al-Qaeda have attempted to dispel some of the mystery and confusion that surrounds the group. This essay will address five of the most serious, and most read, works. An anonymous intelligence officer has authored the best book on al-Qaeda. Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America offers a detailed, nuanced, and thoughtful look at the movement. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, former National Security Council officials turned think tank analysts, provide a strong history of the movement's intellectual foundations in The Age of Sacred Terror, as well as a detailed (if at times apologetic) review of the counterterrorism policy of the Clinton administration.6 Journalist Peter Bergen's Holy War, Inc. is a chatty and at times penetrating look at al-Qaeda, a movement Bergen devoted attention to well before the name was on everyone's lips. In Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Gilles Kepel, a leading French scholar of Islam, does not examine terrorism per se but rather provides a superb account of the broader radical Islamist movement associated with al-Qaeda. The most disappointing book is Rohan Gunaratna's Inside Al Qaeda. Gunaratna, an established terrorism expert who wrote the book while at the University of St. Andrews, offers many interesting but poorly substantiated details. The book itself is more a data dump than a comprehensive analysis. Each of the authors highlights different aspects of al-Qaeda's goals, structure, and weaknesses and offers a range of predictions for the future course of the movement.7

What emerges from these books is a depressing vision of continued terrorism. All the authors see al-Qaeda as capable, committed, and bloodthirsty. This, in itself is not surprising. The United States skirmished with al-Qaeda for years before September 11, and al-Qaeda has continued its attacks since then despite a massive, worldwide counter-terrorism campaign. The truly depressing concern is the image of a more enduring struggle between the United States and Islamic extremism. Although the effort to arrest, kill, or disrupt al-Qaedas leadership may be going well, radical Islam appears to be thriving.

This bleak outlook, however, ignores several positive signs. Infighting among Islamists remains rampant, as al-Qaeda has managed to reduce but not eliminate this perennial problem. Islamist regimes such as the Taliban's Afghanistan have been overthrown, while revolutionary regimes in Sudan and Iran are now far less fervent. Nor have violent movements gained mass support in the Muslim world, as their bloody tactics alienate more Muslims than they attract.

This portrait of al-Qaeda as an adversary suggests several policies. First, many of the bromides regarding counterterrorism in general-often drawn from struggles against small left-wing European groups with at best limited popular appeal-do not apply to al-Qaeda. Its size, dedication, and popular appeal make it unusually formidable-perhaps uniquely so. Second, we must be wary of confusing al-Qaeda with its many affiliates and of confusing these violent radical groups with the broader political Islamist movement. It would be naive to assume the United States can make common cause with such radicals, but it can help prevent them from coalescing into a more menacing whole. Third, the United States must reengage its allies so that its counterterrorism strategy can count on their support. Fourth, public diplomacy, always an American weakness, must go from an episodic and underfunded foreign policy instrument to a major tool of national power. Fifth, al-Qaeda's unusually innovative nature requires the United States to try to defend not only against obvious methods such as truck bombs but also against new means like surface-to-air missiles and sustained campaigns of suicide bombing. Sixth and finally, political leaders must engage the public to increase the ability of the United States to stand fast in the event of another major attack.

This article begins by probing a surprisingly contentious issue: the true nature of al-Qaeda's objectives. It evaluates both its specific grievances and its hostile worldview. Section II examines how al-Qaeda is structured, an often maddening yet vital issue for understanding how the organization works and how to counter it. In particular, al-Qaeda's relationship with other Islamist radical movements and with the broader Islamist current is discussed. Section III looks at whether al-Qaeda is marginalized in the Muslim world. Section IV assesses why al-Qaeda is so formidable, focusing on characteristics that make it distinct from most other terrorist groups. Section V reviews the importance of bin Laden to the group's continued success. Section VI examines the potential for continued strife and the long-term viability of al-Qaeda and related movements. The article concludes by offering policy recommendations based on its assessment of al-Qaeda as an adversary.

I. WHAT DOES AL-QAEDA WANT?

Surprisingly, al-Qaeda's objectives remain in dispute, particularly with regard to the United States. Two camps have emerged. Some pundits maintain that al-Qaeda's objectives are bound up in U.S. policy in the Middle East, in particular the U.S. security presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S. support for Israel. According to this view, al-Qaeda is using terrorism to achieve concrete (though ambitious) goals. Others portray an existential struggle, with al-Qaeda hating our way of life and values. As President Bush noted in his address to Congress on September 21, 2001: "They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. . . . These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life."8

Resolving this debate is vital for making informed policy. On the one hand, a hatred born of U.S. policy implies that often-suggested changes-a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, a strong push for a Palestinian-Israeli peace, and so on-could take the wind out of al-Qaeda's sails. On the other hand, if al-Qaeda can never be appeased, then the struggle becomes existential and there is little reason to think that changing U.S. policy would decrease support for al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda's rage is deep but not inchoate. All the authors agree that al-Qaeda objects to numerous elements of American foreign policy-though some see the movement's grievances as much deeper. Constructing a list of supposed U.S. offenses is instructive.

*A blasphemous military presence. The stationing of U.S. and other Western forces in the Middle East, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula near Muslim holy sites, is the ultimate American sin, trespassing on the heart of the holy land and demonstrating America's desire to subjugate Islam. As bin Laden and other signers of the 1998 World Islamic Front Statement declared: "For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples."9 By permitting this non-Muslim presence, the Saudi regime, in particular, is showing its apostate nature, violating the Prophet Mohammad's injunction, "Let there be no two religions in Arabia" (Bergen, 100-101).

*A blinding bias toward Israel. The United States is seen as creating and nurturing the Jewish state as part of a modern-day colonial venture. Israel's military prowess is a chimera, sustained only by virtue of possible American support. Nor is the United States satisfied with Israel's theft of Muslim land: Washington also condones the killing of innocent Palestinian children and other non-combatants (Bergen, 21).

*Support for a range of corrupt regimes in the Muslim world that oppress and impoverish their people. According to bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders, only the Taliban's Afghanistan and perhaps the Sudan (when Hassan al-Turabi held influence) approached proper Islamic standards. All others ranged from disappointment to outright apostasy. Al-Qaeda leaders appear to focus particularly on Egypt and Algeria, in addition to Saudi Arabia. In the words of bin Laden's deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, these regimes' human rights abuses occur "under the supervision of America" (as quoted in Bergen, 208).

*The destruction, and now enslavement, of Iraq. The United States sought to crush Iraq in order, in bin Laden's 1998 statement, "to destroy Iraq, the most powerful neighboring Arab state." In the process, the United States has engaged in deliberate cruelty in Iraq, allowing one million innocent Iraqis to die under sanctions (Bergen, 22 and 98). The ongoing U.S. occupation is part of an overall U.S. plan to occupy the entire Muslim world.

*Subordination of the Muslim world. In general, the United States seeks to undermine any effort by a Muslim nation to gain strength. In bin Laden's words, the West seeks to "keep Muslims weak and incapable of defending themselves" (as quoted in Anonymous, 53). Thus the United States opposes Pakistan's nuclear program (Bergen, 39).

*Forcing Saudi Arabia and other Muslim oil producers to sell their oil at artificially low prices (Anonymous, 50-52).

*A willingness to tolerate, or even inflict, Muslim deaths in struggles around the world. Al-Qaeda's list would include Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, the Philippines, and the Xinjiang province in China, among others (Anonymous, 17).

A careful look at this list, exaggerated and shrill as it is, shows that it is not completely baseless. The United States is indeed a proud friend of Israel, has sent its troops to defend Saudi Arabia, supported sanctions that contributed to death and misery in Iraq,10 seeks a low (or at least stable) price of oil, and often hesitated to intervene when Muslim lives were at risk.

It is also worth recognizing what is not on this list. As Bergen notes, the grievances are political. Bin Laden "does not rail against the pernicious effects of Hollywood movies, or against Madonna's midriff, or against the pornography protected by the U.S Constitution. Nor does he inveigh against the drug and alcohol culture of the West or its tolerance for homosexuals. He leaves that kind of material to the American Christian fundamentalist Jerry Falwell" (p. 226). Bin Ladens grievances are focused on power-who possesses it, why it is used, and (in his judgment) how it is abused.11

At times, however, al-Qaeda's views go from the extreme to the delusional. For example, bin Laden saw the U.S. intervention in Somalia as the first step in a broader occupation of Africa and the overthrow of the Islamist regime in Sudan. Australia's intervention in East Timor was merely a Christian landgrab. Serbs acted as America's henchmen to kill Muslims in the Balkans (Anonymous, 134 and 230; Benjamin and Simon, 116-21).12

As if this long list of offenses were not enough, these specific grievances are tied to a broader agenda that al-Qaeda shares with the wider Islamist movement of restoring Muslim dignity and reestablishing God's rule (Anonymous, 4). The American superpower is resented for its "cultural hegemony, global political influence, and overwhelming conventional military power" (Benjamin and Simon, 407). The ubiquitous presence of American popular culture only fuels the anger of Islamists.

Increasingly, this hatred goes beyond current disagreements and is directed at, in the words of Sayyid Qutb, a leading Islamist thinker who inspired many al-Qaeda officials, the "Crusader spirit which runs in the blood of all westerners" (as quoted in Benjamin and Simon, 66). Radical Islamists are combining this view of an eternal conflict with the West with virulent anti-Semitism (historically rare in the Muslim world). They then interpret all current events as part of a broader conspiracy against Islam and, armed with these "facts," contend that the United States is truly evil rather than merely misguided.13

Al-Qaeda's grievances, while shared by many Muslims, are a departure from the traditional agendas of most Islamist groups, even violent ones. For much of recent history, radical Islamist groups sought first to overthrow the "near enemy"-secular and repressive Arab regimes.14 Only then, radical Islamists declared, should the "far enemy"-Israel and the United States-be confronted. Bin Laden turns this idea on its head: ending U.S. hegemony, he argues, will produce the collapse of pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world (Anonymous, 49). As he remarked, "If we cut off the head of America, the kingdoms in the Arab world will cease to exist" (as quoted in Anonymous, xviii).

Jihad is a central concept in this struggle. Radical Islamists reject the claim that jihad is primarily an individual's spiritual struggle against his baser instincts and instead interpret it to be actual warfare-a view that appears to have strong historical support. Jihad in their view is as much a pillar of faith as fasting during Ramadan or praying five times a day. Indeed, the radicals take this concept to new heights, arguing that jihad can be declared against Muslims who are insufficiently pious, particularly Muslim rulers (Benjamin and Simon, 48-55).15

Islamists attracted to al-Qaeda see themselves as on the defensive and use this argument to justify their strikes on the United States.16 In their eyes, the United States has long attacked the Muslim world, subjugating its lands and dishonoring its people. This distinction between the offensive and the defensive is more than semantics. Many Muslim scholars argue that the defense of Islam is a duty that all individuals must fulfill, in contrast to efforts to extend the faith, which some members of the Muslim community can discharge on behalf of all the faithful (Anonymous, 53; Benjamin and Simon, 49-50). For example, bin Laden's teacher, Abdallah Azzam, declared "jihad is every man's duty" if foreigners seize Muslim lands (as quoted in Kepel, 318). In a video that circulated in the Middle East in the months before September 2001, bin Laden declared, "If you don't fight you will be punished by God" (as quoted in Bergen, 28).

Because of the scope of its grievances, its broader agenda of rectifying humiliation, and a poisoned worldview that glorifies jihad as a solution, appeasing al-Qaeda is difficult in theory and impossible in practice. It is hard to imagine what would suffice, as so many U.S. interests are involved that even significant policy changes would be only the tip of the iceberg.

Indeed, al-Qaeda's mix of specific grievances and cosmic injustice creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. For al-Qaeda, the numerous American sins prove how inherently corrupt America is and this, in turn, taints any U.S. gesture that might on the surface seem pro-Muslim. In essence, the United States is damned cither way: delaying intervention, as in the Balkans, leads to charges of condoning Muslim deaths, while early intervention, as in Somalia, fosters claims of imperialism.17 Pushing the Middle East peace negotiations, similarly, would be interpreted as an attempt to force docile Muslim regimes to legitimate Zionist imperialism rather than as a step forward in the Palestinian cause.

In essence, al-Qaeda seeks America's unconditional surrender. It wants all forms of U.S. influence-including cultural-withdrawn from the Muslim world (Anonymous, 256). Any concessions regarding Israel, troops in the Arabian peninsula, and so on would simply be milestones on al-Qaeda's path to victory. In fact, al-Qaeda regards attacking as a goal in and of itself, demonstrating the movement's strength and determination.

Given this mix of objectives, it is not surprising that Al-Qaeda's attacks go beyond seeking political or strategic advantage in an attempt to advance its cause. Al-Qaeda concentrates heavily on targets that are symbols of American hegemony, such as embassies and military forces and facilities. Yet the attacks are more than just moves in a global game of chess, designed simply to provoke a particular move from the United States. In Benjamin and Simon's words, al-Qaeda's attacks are meant "to humiliate and slaughter those who defied the hegemony of God" (Benjamin and Simon, 40). Indeed, mass casualties serve both a strategic and a redemptive purpose, forcing the West to take note of alQaeda's position and, at the same time, bringing the suffering of the Muslim world to the attention of otherwise oblivious Americans.18

II. HOW IS AL-QAEDA STRUCTURED?

Unlike many radical groups, al-Qaeda cadres carry out many functions, and its organizational structure reflects its multipurpose nature. Al-Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to execute exceptionally lethal attacks on a global scale, but terrorism is neither its only nor necessarily its primary function. For many years, the bulk of al-Qaeda's energy went into training and supporting guerrilla fighters who fought along-side the Taliban (Gunaratna, 40). Similarly, al-Qaeda backs Islamist insurgencies in the Philippines, Chechnya, Indonesia, Georgia, Algeria, and elsewhere, acting, in Benjamin and Simon's words, as the "quarter-master for jihad" (p. 113). Al-Qaeda also sees itself as a missionary organization, proselytizing on behalf of its own interpretation of Islam and putting out propaganda against the Al Saud and other Arab regimes (Benjamin and Simon, 131; Gunaratna, 34). Thus it seeks to influence the agendas of other, autonomous terrorist groups, making them more anti-American and less inclined toward compromise with secular states. In addition, its propaganda is intended to raise the consciousness of Muslims worldwide.

Al-Qaeda's unusual structure leads to confusion about its size-an accurate judgment about which can be reached only after carefully parsing out what, exactly, al-Qaeda is. The organization draws on the support of over six million more radicals worldwide19 (Gunaratna, 8 and 95). Gunaratna estimates that between 10,000 and 110,000 fighters trained in al-Qaeda camps but-reflecting the high-quality recruits it seeks-that the organization invited only 3,000 to join its elite ranks. However, even the figure of three thousand may be something of an overstatement if al-Qaeda's insurgency-related activities are excluded. The al-Qaeda core devoted to terrorism or skilled operations beyond simple participation in guerrilla war may be far smaller than is generally realized. Thus, the group of highly skilled and dedicated members that has sworn loyalty to Osama bin Laden and that has focused on terrorism probably numbers in the hundreds (Bergen, 35).

What makes precise numbers so elusive, however, is that al-Qaeda is simultaneously a small core group and a broader network linking various Islamist groups and causes. Al-Qaeda has spun a web of relationships with Islamist groups that espouse similar, though not always identical, goals. Gunaratna argues: "It is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities" (p. 54). Al-Qaeda's core group of guerrillas and terrorists is in turn connected with like-minded groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and literally dozens of other radical organizations. The anonymous intelligence officer claims that al-Qaeda is active in Sudan, Somalia, Morocco, South Africa, Libya, Algeria, Mauritania, Nigeria, Madagascar, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea (p. 179). Bergen uses the analogy of al-Qaeda as a holding company, exercising anywhere from partial to near complete control over a range of other groups (p. 32). When these groups are added in, al-Qaeda's manpower increases dramatically-a conclusion that requires a dramatically expanded estimate of the size and appeal of the adversary.

Many of these organizations differ from al-Qaeda with regard to objectives or at least to priorities. For example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan focuses largely on Uzbekistan and to a lesser degree on Central Asia-and not on the struggle against America. The Taliban in Afghanistan and Jemaat Islamiyyah in Indonesia are concerned about the penetration of Western popular culture, as suggested by its attack on the Bali discotheque. For them, in contrast to bin Laden, Madonna's midriff is a fighting issue.

Even when it does not exercise direct control or have identical objectives, al-Qaeda has tried to weave various jihadist elements together into a broader network that, while hardly unified, is capable of working in concert for common goals. It assists groups with logistics and skilled personnel to encourage cooperation and unity of purpose.20 For example, bin Laden reconciled two leading Egyptian groups, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, that had long been bitter rivals despite their overall shared agenda (Anonymous, 129-30; Gunaratna, 44).

The conceptual key is to see al-Qaeda as more than just a terrorist group along the lines of the Weathermen or Abu Nidal. Rather, bin Laden is promoting (and at times directing) a "worldwide, religiously inspired, and professionally guided Islamist insurgency" (Anonymous, xviii ). Although the spectacular terrorist attacks are what garner the most U.S. attention, it is the grinding low-intensity conflicts that cause the most suffering and have the potential to effect the most dramatic change (Anonymous, 207). In addition, many of these causes are seen as legitimate liberation struggles by Muslims who reject terrorism, thus expanding the jihadists' appeal.

The mix of mergers, alliances, and tactical ties among Islamist groups is bewildering for government officials and outside analysts alike-a confusion exacerbated by trying to figure out how to interpret the limited information available. In particular, it is easy to confuse a tactical alliance with a merger. For example, Gunaratna claims that phone calls from Afghanistan to Iran demonstrate a strong Hezbollah-Iran-al-Qaeda connection (Gunaratna, 12 and 146-48). Similarly, Secretary Powell and other senior Bush administration officials also stated that Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, a leading al-Qaeda operative, received medical care in Iraq and established a cell with Iraqi connivance. Other senior administration officials reported that Iraqi officials and al-Qaeda leaders had met several times in the decade before September 11.

Contact, however, is not the same as control. The anonymous intelligence officer contends there is little reason to believe that there is any substantial al-Qaeda cooperation with Iran and its proxy, the Lebanese Hezbollah, even though there is some tactical cooperation on training and logistics-a view endorsed by Benjamin and Simon (Anonymous, 185; Benjamin and Simon, 127-38). Indeed, Gunaratna himself later notes that al-Qaeda's cooperation with non-Sunnis such as the Lebanese Hezbollah is at most tactical (p. 74). Similarly, all the authors are dismissive of any serious links between Saddams regime and al-Qaeda (Anonymous, 184; Benjamin and Simon, 264; Bergen, 244; and Gunaratna, 149).

III. HOW INFLUENTIAL IS AL-QAEDA?

Given al-Qaeda's ties to a range of insurgencies and local groups, a key question is to identify where the organization's influence stops. Do other radical groups and ideologues share al-Qaeda's objectives and worldview? Speaking to Congress and the nation in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, President Bush declared: "The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics-a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam."21 This view is comforting, for if al-Qaeda's views are indeed on the fringe, then the organization's ability to recruit, raise money, and sustain itself in the face of a worldwide manhunt are diminished. But if many Muslims share al-Qaeda's vision, then the organization, or a successor, can count on continued support and sympathy.

Unfortunately, al-Qaeda has expanded its appeal through various struggles that it sponsors. By organizing and training jihadists, al-Qaeda makes local conflicts more deadly and gains a venue for pressing its own worldview. These conflicts, in turn, produce a pool of alumni who give al-Qaeda greater reach and increase the attractiveness of the broader jihadist cause. To broaden the group further, Al-Qaeda taps into the pool of between seven thousand and nine thousand Arabs who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Most of these individuals returned home and rejoined society at large. The problem, as former CIA officer Milton Bearden noted, was that "they didn't die in great numbers. They died in tiny numbers, and they did come back" (as quoted in Anonymous, 111).

Violent movements are also linked to an even broader network that includes charities supporting relief in Chechnya, Islamic education efforts in Southeast Asia, and fund-raising in Europe. The network of nongovernmental organizations is particularly important. NGOs are a means of raising money, but they also are valuable for giving activists jobs, channeling money, and acquiring necessary documents. In addition, Western police and security forces often hesitate (particularly before September 11) to investigate any charity (Anonymous, 40; Benjamin and Simon, 144-45; Gunaratna, 5).

Many Islamist political movements share their violent coreligionists' ultimate objectives, disagreeing only on the means to achieving them.22 Gunaratna points out that Islamist groups that condemned al-Qaeda after September 11 did so not because they felt the attacks were wrong but rather because they felt the time was not yet right and therefore risked American retaliation (p. 10). In particular, several Islamist leaders have argued that jihad will inevitably fail until the Muslim world is united-a criticism of bin Laden that sounds harsh to Islamist ears but is hardly reassuring to Westerners (Benjamin and Simon, 171).

Going beyond the world of active Islamists, the picture remains gloomy. Bin Laden is not a voice in the wilderness. Bergen notes that while "only a tiny minority [of Muslims] are committed to violence against American citizens," many are angry at U.S. policies in the Middle East. The radical view that Muslim governments that collaborate with the West are illegitimate appears to be gaining ground, particularly as these governments rely on repression while failing to deliver economically. Although power remains concentrated in the hands of secular elites, the foundation of their rule is increasingly thin (Benjamin and Simon, 172-75).

Many Muslims, particularly Arabs, share al-Qaeda's resentment of and disdain for the United States and its values (Anonymous, 16). Poll results of the Pew Charitable Trusts released following the war in Iraq, in June 2003, indicated that "people in most predominantly Muslim countries remain overwhelmingly opposed to the U.S., and in several cases these negative feelings have increased dramatically."23 The result is a bias against U.S. efforts to counter al-Qaeda. Increasingly, claims that the United States is denigrating Islam and endangering Muslim children are gaining credence (Anonymous, 229).

Al-Qaeda's appeal goes beyond the Arab world. Many new babies in Muslim parts of Nigeria are named Osama, and only 38 percent of Nigeria's Muslims have a favorable opinion of the United States, a decline from 71 percent last year.24 Jihadist appeal is very strong in Europe as well. Benjamin and Simon cite a Sunday Times (London) poll that found that an astonishing 40 percent of British Muslims supported bin Laden's attacks on the United States (Benjamin and Simon, 213).

Some of these Muslims back up their feelings with money: Gunaratna contends that Saudis donate $1.6 million a day to Islamic causes in general (p. 144). Many of these Muslims believe they are contributing to legitimate causes, such as humanitarian relief in the Caucasus or efforts to help resistance to Israel, but the logistics networks for these causes often overlap with those of al-Qaeda.

The picture is ominous, suggesting that al-Qaeda's appeal, or at least the appeal of its ideology, runs deep. Indeed, al-Qaeda's railing against modern-day Crusaders and its talk of the subjugation of Islam raises the issue of the much-maligned "clash of civilizations." Political scientist Samuel Huntington has famously argued that the problem is Islam, not Islamic fundamentalism: "It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power."25 In the West, Huntington's work has been widely criticized, particularly with regard to its depiction of the Muslim world and its inaccurate predictions of where conflict will occur.26

The clash, however, is useful as a concept for understanding bin Laden's vision. Bin Laden wants to create a clash, using violence to energize what he sees as a passive Muslim world27 (Bergen, 230). By revealing America's true colors and forcing it to overreact, Muslims will inevitably take sides in this cosmic battle (Benjamin and Simon, 157-58). And he is succeeding. As the anonymous intelligence officer notes, "Thus, with or without bin Laden, and whether or not the West accepts it, many Muslims appear to think a war against Islam is underway" (p. 245).

Once again, our picture of al-Qaeda as an adversary looms ever larger. We come to see that al-Qaeda and other violent movements are only the tip of a much longer spear. The networks connecting al-Qaeda members, their supporters, and other sympathizers are dense and can be found in much of the Muslim world.

Yet we must remember that the more inclusively we portray the enemy, the greater the potential for fissures in its ranks. At times, it may make sense to include groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or contributors to Hamas's coffers as part of al-Qaeda, but one must then be mindful of the fact that these myriad groups and individuals have different goals, motivations, skill levels, and degrees of dedication.

IV. WHY IS AL-QAEDA SO FORMIDABLE?

Al-Qaeda derives its status as the world's most dangerous terrorist group from a variety of reasons. As discussed above, its ability to tap into broader resentment in the Muslim world ensures it a steady stream of supporters and new recruits, even as governments step up efforts to crush it. In addition, the group's mix of elements of hierarchy and global network offer several advantages, enabling it to weather leadership losses and the disruption of cells in numerous countries.28 But al-Qaeda's advantages do not end there.

Al-Qaeda's structure and the composition of its personnel are remarkable. The anonymous intelligence official notes, "Bin Laden's organization is larger, more ethnically diverse, more geographically dispersed, younger, richer, better educated, better led, and more military trained and combat experienced" than other terrorist groups in history (p. 18). Al-Qaeda is an organization composed of elites; few who are not capable of leadership are invited to join. Its membership of many nationalities makes it far more able to engage in global operations, giving it the ability to blend in wherever its adherents find themselves. Al-Qaeda is also remarkably bureaucratic, with myriad committees of specialists whose expertise ranges from military operations to publicity (Benjamin and Simon, 105; Gunaratna, 57).

In addition to its strong appeal and an unusual structure, al-Qaeda's inner core is extremely sensitive to operational security-a life or death issue for most terrorist groups.29 Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman notes that approximately 90 percent of all terrorist groups collapse within a year, and only half of the hardy remainder make it through another decade.30 Al-Qaeda has avoided this fate by focusing intensely on operational security, directing all operatives to blend in with local populations, be wary of intelligence and police services, speak in code or avoid specifics except in rare circumstances, and otherwise minimize vulnerability to disruption. For example, one member of the cell in Kenya that carried out the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi in 1998 noted that "we, the East Africa cell members, do not want to know about the operations plan since we are just implementers" (as quoted in Bergen, 32).

Al-Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to adapt its methods and structure in response to setbacks or failures. While it has often drawn on several regional hubs in plotting global operations,31 it has proved willing to move these hubs, shifting responsibility from one country to another in accordance with changes in the security environment (Gunaratna, 95). One of its manuals, Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, calls for evaluating operations after they are carried out in order to learn from them (Gunaratna, 72). This willingness to confront mistakes gives the organization the ability to recover quickly from disaster or successful countermeasures.

Al-Qaeda's unusual organizational structure also enables it to endure and remain agile even though it has lost its base in Afghanistan. As Benjamin and Simon contend:

Virtuality has its own advantages. A dispersed group is harder to locate and attack. Some elements will inevitably be identified and arrested, but other parts of the network will not be affected. With their Macintosh laptops and encrypted communications, stolen credit cards, access to Internet cafes and disposable cell phones, false passports, and comfort with long distance travel, jihadists can be everywhere and anywhere, (p. 169)

Al-Qaeda is unusually patient, unlike most other terrorists, who are eager to take action and demonstrate that their cause will triumph.32 Al-Qaeda, by contrast, is willing to promote operations, such as the September 11 attacks and the 1998 embassy bombings, that take years to bear fruit (Bergen, 109). In addition, the organization penetrates military and intelligence services in order to bolster their long-term position (Anonymous, 21-22).

For an extremist group, al-Qaeda is remarkably tolerant. Many extremist organizations see other radical organizations as more dangerous than the regimes they oppose. For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Gamaat Islamiyya-both of which advocated an Islamic government in Egypt and the violent overthrow of the Mubarak government-directed much of their invective toward each other and invested a lot of their energy in infighting.33 Many religious groups also draw their members entirely from one ethnic group and regard others with suspicion.34 Al-Qaeda, however, does not limit its activities to radical Sunni Arab circles but instead tries to build bridges between like-minded groups and forge ties to revolutionaries, regardless of whether they share all or even most of its goals. If this bridging effort fails, cooperation is still possible. Al-Qaeda thus works with many groups that seek to target apostate Muslim regimes first instead of the United States, as does al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is reported to have worked tactically with the Lebanese Hezbollah, even though many Sunni Islamists regard Shia Hezbollah members as apostates (Anonymous, 85). Bin Laden's call for resistance against the U.S. attack on Iraq also reflects a willingness to support hostile secular regimes when this suits his purposes.

Finally, al-Qacda's leadership has a strategic view of terror. In addition to using violence to shock enemies and glorify God, al-Qaeda leaders clearly seek to use the reactions of the United States and its other adversaries against them. For example, it is now clear that bin Laden sought to bring a heavy U.S. military response to the September 11 attacks on Afghanistan, believing (so far, wrongly) that this would precipitate a broader clash between the West and the Islamic world.35 Although he clearly underestimated U.S. resolve, power, and skill, in both his small and large actions he has attempted to manipulate and use the American response to suit his ends.

Money, particularly bin Laden's money, is often cited as a key to alQaeda's success, and indeed several experts have argued that eliminating its money is the way to defeat it.36 This claim is at least overstated and probably wrong. While it is true that al-Qaeda is well funded-the anonymous intelligence officer contends that much of al-Qaeda's wealth comes from wealthy Muslims, many of whom support various jihadist causes-more important is the extent to which money matters at all. The officer notes that God and the prospect of martyrdom, not money, inspire al-Qaeda members (p. 253)-a view echoed by Bergen (p. 107). Their training is cheap and the operations cost relatively little (Anonymous, 31-38).

V. THE IMPORTANCE OF BIN LADEN

Bin Laden himself is a giant today. Few question his personal piety and courage (Gunaratna, 53). In Saudi Arabia, younger Saudis lionize him as a giant compared with the pygmies of the Al Saud.37 Gunaratna even contends bin Laden is so important that his death will reverse al-Qaeda's momentum: "Just as Nazism effectively died with Hitler, Islamism of the Al Qaeda brand is likely to die with Osama" (p. 235).

Yet Gunaratna's optimism is misplaced. If bin Laden died, al-Qaeda and particularly jihadist Islam would live on. The anonymous intelligence officer notes that al-Qaeda has many talented lieutenants (Anonymous, 241). In addition, bin Laden himself has prepared for his own demise and has claimed that "my martyrdom would lead to the birth of thousands of Osamas" (as quoted in Anonymous, 6). And in this he appears correct. Bin Laden's image is far more powerful than the man himself.

In any event, bin Laden has helped radicals forge ties that exist independent of him, constituting a jihadist network that may be his most enduring legacy. As Paul Pillar argues: "This network is something like the Internet: it is a significant transnational phenomenon that has grown in recent years and that some determined people have used to their advantage, but nobody owns or controls it."38 Bin Laden's death would not undo the literally thousands of personal relationships that have formed in the last decade under his wing.

Even more chilling is the impact of bin Laden's worldview. His insistence that the United States is at the root of the Muslim world's problems has gained remarkable currency. In addition, his use of violence and scorn for regional governments has helped legitimize terrorism for many Muslims.

This is not to say that the death of bin Laden would not be important. Sheer justice demands some sort of accounting. In addition, bin Laden personally helped direct several of al-Qaeda's most devastating terrorist attacks. Even more importantly, bin Laden's continued survival in the face of a worldwide manhunt is a symbol of successful defiance, making the United States look impotent. Potential successors to bin Laden such as Ayman Zawahiri are far less inspiring, suggesting the movement would be less dangerous if he died. In addition, many organizations, particularly those led by a charismatic figure, splinter when the leader is removed. Rival leaders may emerge, to engage in a power struggle or to fight over the movement's next steps.

VI. AN ETERNAL STRUGGLE?

Terrorism experts see the future as grim. You can "safely predict," Gunaratna claims, that al-Qaeda will "continue to stage spectacular land, sea, and air attacks in the future, especially against symbolic or high-profile targets in Europe, North America, and elsewhere" (p. 78). Indeed, some experts posit that September 11 may be only a prelude to a larger struggle. Benjamin and Simon point to a disturbing increase in apocalyptic writing among Islamists, with open expressions of fantasies of mass destruction (pp. 91-92). Al-Qaeda also is openly seeking chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons,39 as bin Laden himself has declared the acquisition of such weapons to be a religious duty (Anonymous, 187).

Optimists may counter by pointing to the impressive successes at counterterrorism that have occurred since September 11. The United States and its allies have done a remarkable job of disrupting al-Qaeda cells, capturing or killing its leaders, and otherwise dulling the edge of its sword. In February 2003 the director of central intelligence testified that "more than one-third of the top al-Qa'ida leadership identified before the war has been captured or lolled."40 In March 2003 the United States and its allies scored perhaps their biggest success yet: the capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, the mastermind of September 11 and a key al-Qaeda planner and facilitator. Most important, there has so far not been another attack on the scale of September 11-an encouraging sign.

Nonetheless, focusing on such successes, impressive as they are, fails to capture al-Qaeda's recuperative capacity, its relationship with other groups, and its broader appeal in the Muslim world. Al-Qaeda remains an organization of leaders. Arresting one-third of its leadership is a harsh blow, but new leaders can replace those who have fallen, and recruitment continues without abatement.41 Even as the core of al-Qaeda appears to be taking heavy blows, Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Algeria, and elsewhere soldier on.

To see the true silver lining, one must go beyond the world of terrorism specialists and look to the changing role of Islam in the Muslim world. From an Islamist point of view, the last decade has hardly been a success. Two self-declared "Islamic states"-Sudan and Afghanistan-have become markedly less so in recent years. In December 1999 Khartoum jailed the prominent Islamist and anti-American champion Hassan al-Turabi. Two years later, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan fell to U.S.-backed forces. The much-feared "Talibanization" of Pakistan has been checked, although the possibility remains disturbingly plausible. Attempts to overturn the governments of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, among others, have failed (Kepel, 205-322). Iran's "government of God" is in crisis, with widespread disillusionment throughout Iranian society and much of its clerical leadership.42

In addition, many of al-Qaeda's supposed strengths also involve potential weaknesses. To preserve operational security, the organization can conduct far fewer operations and is less able to disseminate its worldview.43 There is a reason that many organizations choose hierarchy as their preferred form. The much-vaunted network structure of alQaeda, while making it easier for the organization to survive, makes it far harder for it to engage in concerted action.

Virtuality also has its drawbacks. Although al-Qaeda enjoys bases in Yemen, Indonesia, and elsewhere, it does not have the ability to recruit, train, and plan as it did when it had its base in Afghanistan (Bergen, 239-240). Supporting the global insurgency is far harder without control of actual territory.

Nor is the unity that bin Laden has fostered necessarily permanent or even solid. Nationalism still divides many Islamist movements, with Hamas focused first on Palestine, the Islamic Group focused first on Egypt, and so on. Even within al-Qaeda, the prominence of Egyptians in the senior ranks has bred resentment. Indeed, familiarity at times breeds contempt. In London the presence of representatives from a wide range of Islamist groups has "led to a tempest of reciprocal excommunications and anathemas" (Kepel, 304). National sentiment is an exceptionally strong form of identity, and it has cracked international communism, Arab unity, Christendom, and other past pretenders to universalism.

Indeed, while the radical worldview is strong, its tactics may be backfiring. Kepel contends that the "savage violence" of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda has worked against them. Rather than inspire other Muslims to take up arms against the West or apostate regimes, they have instead disgusted their coreligionists, leading them to reject extremism (Kepel, 299). In addition, their violence often reflects a lack of grassroots support or organization (Kepel, 320).

With each successful terrorist attack, it is tempting to declare the ever-expanding strength of the jihadist cause and portray al-Qaeda as ten feet tall. From al-Qaeda's perspective, however, the situation is also unsatisfactory. Although the organization has scored important successes in bonding similar organizations to one another and spreading its worldview, it still remains far from exercising direct political control over a state. As such, al-Qaeda has purpose but only limited power.

Al-Qaeda's lethality and dedication clearly make it formidable, but this strength still is a far cry from making the danger truly existential. As John Mueller acidly notes, the United States "absorbs" forty thousand traffic deaths a year, far more than the devastating attacks of September 11.44 In addition, the strength of political Islam in the United States itself appears limited. Although the potential is far greater than was realized before September 11, there are few signs that the United States has a restive Muslim population of the type found in France, the United Kingdom, or other Western countries. Al-Qaeda can and will continue to kill Americans, but the numbers remain limited and U.S. institutions remain solid.

VII. MEETING THE THREAT

The portrait of al-Qaeda drawn in this essay offers several lessons for the United States and its allies in countering the threat it poses. The first lesson involves recognizing the unusual nature of al-Qaeda and taking care to draw relevant lessons from other counterterrorist campaigns. Although political leaders of all stripes talk of a "war on terrorism," the concept is not useful in structuring a campaign against al-Qaeda. Terrorist groups like Germany's Red Army Faction or November 17 in Greece are small and limited in their scope: unlike alQaeda, they do not pose a global threat, are not innovative, and lack the ability to recuperate if their leaders are killed or arrested. Even larger and more capable groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army are far smaller and more geographically focused in their activities than al-Qaeda. Most important, al-Qaeda is willing to inflict mass casualties on U.S. soil, a thankfully rare goal for a terrorist organization.

When fighting al-Qaeda, the lessons of counterinsurgency may prove more useful than those of counterterrorism, particularly when fighting al-Qaeda among hostile populations or where the rule of law is weak. Afghanistan and increasingly Iraq are important battlefields for the United States. The enemies there are not only terrorists using truck bombs but also snipers shooting Iraqi politicians, thugs harassing aid workers, and guerrillas ambushing American soldiers. Such activities are often "terrorism," but they are part of a larger insurgency that can be fought only by trying to win local Iraqi support through economic development, building a new Iraqi regime and Iraqi institutions, and otherwise winning over the (tired phrase though it is) hearts and minds of Iraqis. Most important, the United States must strive to avoid the self-fulfilling prophecy that bin Laden and other insurgents want to create: to provoke a heavy-handed U.S. response to terrorism and then exploit it to generate more support for the overall cause.

Even more important, we must differentiate the various components of the broader radical Islamist movement. As noted above, what we call "al-Qaeda" has several different layers, ranging from a hard core of committed radicals at the top, to a large group of like-minded but less skilled affiliates, to a broad range of potential supporters. Counterterrorism strategy takes account of these different levels. Current efforts to arrest or kill senior al-Qaeda leaders must continue. But we must be careful not to create more enemies than necessary. In particular, policy must seek to avoid turning groups with primarily local aspirations into ones that share al-Qaeda's global agenda. Chechnya may be a case in point. Chechen rebels first and foremost seek independence from Russia. Although many Chechens sympathize with al-Qaeda and a smaller number actively collaborate with it, turning the entire movement against Washington offers few dividends for the United States. Indeed, equating al-Qaeda and terrorism and labeling any organization with sympathy for al-Qaeda as part of a monolithic terrorist internationale, as the rhetoric of war implies, may become a self-fulfilling prophecy by forcing us to take the government side in every internal dispute if the government portrays its struggle as countcrterrorism. In the end this will bolster al-Qaeda in places where its current presence is limited, such as the Xinjiang region of China.

Al-Qaeda's infighting and limited mass support are potential weaknesses to exploit. When possible, U.S. policy should try to distinguish between those groups supporting violence against the United States and those that simply dislike or denounce America, focusing the most attention on those groups that materially support or perpetrate antiAmerican violence. Al-Qaeda's ideological appeal-and the money, arms, and volunteers it can help provide-must be countered by a fear that working with al-Qaeda will bring down the heavy hand of the United States on the group and lead Washington to actively side with its enemies. The death of bin Laden and Zawahiri may also contribute, leading to leadership struggles and, perhaps, the emergence of new commanders more focused on regional rather than global objectives.

The United States also must redouble efforts to gain strategic allies in the fight against terrorism.45 Europe was a staging ground for the September 11 attacks, and its large Arab and Muslim population represents a potential pool on which al-Qaeda can draw. Similarly, their police and intelligence services offer additional assets-and at times superior skills-to complement U.S. efforts.46 The goodwill gained after September 11 has been strained by the U.S. war against Iraq. To restore this, the United States should emphasize the shared interests in fighting violent Islamic radicalism, which historically has threatened Europe even more than the United States.

The United States can make several, concessions to restore European support that do not jeopardize key objectives. For example, the use of capital punishment on terrorists makes it far harder for European governments to cooperate with American law-enforcement officials.47 Although it would be satisfying for the mass murderers in al-Qaeda's leadership to face death, this would simply martyr them and-more important-would cause strategic damage that hinders future counterterrorism cooperation with much of Europe. Having terrorists spend their time in jail satisfies the demands of both justice and strategy.

Public diplomacy is essential. So far, al-Qaeda is winning the battle of ideas: its concept of defensive jihad is gaining credence, as is its credo that the United States is at the root of the Muslim world's problems. As a result, the movement or one like it will continue to win recruits and be able to rely on a sympathetic populace to shelter it. To counter this, the poor track record-political, economic, and humanitarian-of self-proclaimed Islamic governments in Afghanistan and Sudan should be publicized constantly, making it clear that the promises that alQaeda and like-minded groups offer are empty. The United States also must try to reinforce traditional Islamic voices-ones that do not see attacks on the United States as part of a defensive jihad-even if at times aspects of their teachings go against other U.S. values. The United States should also emphasize its efforts in such places as the Balkans and Somalia, where it has gone to war on the side of Muslims rather than against them. Public diplomacy should try to offer a competing narrative, one that plays up the friendlier side of U.S. foreign policy and justifies less popular aspects.

Doing so will require massive changes in the way the United States handles public diplomacy. In October 2003 a government advisory group chaired by former ambassador Edward P. Djerejian found that U.S. public diplomacy "has become outmoded, lacking both strategic direction and resources."48 The report calls for a "dramatic transformation in public diplomacy," including massive funding increases, significant bureaucratic changes, and high-level political involvement and direction in its conduct. Of course, al-Qaeda and other radicals angry at U.S. policy will not be swayed even by the best public diplomacy, but it will help the United States counter some of the most egregious mischaracterizations of U.S. policy and gain credit for its many actions on behalf of the world's Muslims. The Arab and Muslim world will not suddenly embrace American policy, but some may be led to oppose the use of violence or to direct their vitriol elsewhere.

Given al-Qaeda's lethality and appeal, we must expect further attacks. Moreover, because al-Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to innovate, defenses must be improved not only against traditional attacks such as car bombs but also against new potential threats. One obvious area of concern is the threat to aviation of surface-to-air missiles. Al-Qaeda has already tried to down an Israeli airplane over Kenya; given increased measures to guard against a hijacking in the United States and the continued attraction of commercial aviation as a symbolic and economic target, additional missile attacks must be deemed as plausible, if not probable. A second potential threat is a sustained series of suicide bombings in the United States. Hoffman has warned that what we have seen in Israel could be repeated in the United States.49

A final necessity is a campaign of public education by U.S. political leaders: although al-Qaeda poses a lethal threat, they must emphasize that it is not necessarily an existential one. The president and other senior leaders must try to minimize the popular fear and the impact of economic and political damage that would result from even a limited attack in the United States. Violence is almost certain to continue for at least the coming decade. If Americans can remain steadfast, the government can better avoid mistakes and overreactions that play into al-Qaeda's hands.

[Footnote]

1 After comparing the available studies of the damage of the attacks, the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated the total impact to be $83 billion. This figure varies considerably depending on which direct and indirect costs are included. The GAO report is available at http://www.house.gov/maloney /gaoreport.pdf.

2 See Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). Roy contends that Islamist movements focused on gaining power in states have failed to gain power or even a wide following. Roy also describes the growth of what he calls "lumpen-Islamism," a more atavistic form of political Islam, that would include bin Laden's violent credo.

3 World War III is considered to be the cold war. Eliot Cohen initially articulated the concept of World War IV, but other prominent voices such as former CIA director James Woolsey have also adopted it. See Eliot Cohen, "World War IV," Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2001 (electronic version); Maureen Dowd, "Neocon Coup at the Department d'Etat," New York Times, August 6, 2003 (electronic version). For a view that the threat may be overstated, see John Mueller, "Harbinger or Aberration? A 9/11 Provocation," National Interest (Fall 2002); and Laura K. Donahue, "Fear Itself: Counterterrorism, Individual Rights, and U.S. Foreign Relations Post 9-11," in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, eds., Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (Guilford, Conn.: McGraw Hill, 2002).

4 The congressional 9/11 inquiry found that the Central Intelligence Agency had repeatedly warned that al-Qaeda was determined to conduct mass casualty attacks, including on U.S. soil.

5 Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security 27 (Winter 2002-3), 57.

6 Benjamin and Simon's book is really two books. The first half covers the evolution of the ideology of al-Qaeda and like-minded groups, while the second half examines the counterterrorism policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations, often from a firsthand perspective. While the second half of the book is fascinating, this article focuses on the first half.

7 The readability and thoroughness of these documents vary considerably. The anonymous intelligence officer's book is excruciatingly referenced, perhaps to smooth its public release; the many references help the author prove that he or she is not divulging classified information. Reflecting the authors' nonacademic origins and the mass audiences intended for their books, the Benjamin and Simon tome and Bergen's work have far fewer sources, relying often on their own observations-most of which are lucid and convincing. The translation of Kepel's book is superb.

Of the five, Gunaratna's book is the most problematic. Although it often overwhelms the reader in detail, many of its key claims, such as bin Ladens supposed involvement in the assassination of his mentor and partner, Abdullah Azzam, are unsupported. In addition, it often relies on intelligence reporting without so much as a hint of whether the material is from an interview, a document, or a media leak (Gunaratna, 23). Other claims advanced by Gunaratna deserve additional substantiation: a figure attributed to the CIA without further sourcing that terrorist groups have infiltrated one-fifth of Islamic NGOs (p. 6); the size of bin Ladens personal fortune, where he maddeningly cites Swiss and British intelligence as estimating up to $500 million while also citing unnamed intelligence as showing that "in fact" the figure is between $25 and $30 million (p. 19); that Clinton authorized the CIA to kill bin Laden but that the agency failed because it had no human assets in the field (pp. 47-48); the claim that USS Cole was selected as a target because it was an "Arleigh-Burke" class destroyer, the same type of ship as was used to launch the 1998 cruise missiles on Afghanistan (p. 140); and that the U.S. decision not to criminalize Hezbollah leaders led them and al-Qaeda to assume they could freely attack the United States (p. 148).

8 The full text of the speech is available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush .transcript/.

9 The full text is available at http://www.fas.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.

10 For an excellent review of the impact of sanctions, see Amatzia Baram, "The Effect of Iraqi Sanctions: Statistical Pitfalls and Responsibility," Middle East Journal 54 (Spring 2000). The text is available at http://www.mideasti.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/articles/baram.html.

11 Bin Laden is not alone in this emphasis. Other leading radicals such as Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, a Lebanese cleric often considered Hezbollah's spiritual leader, and writers associated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad have also emphasized the importance of power in their work. I would like to thank John Voll for bringing this to my attention.

12 See also Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 68.

13 Bin Laden's own ambitions remain mysterious. The anonymous intelligence officer contends that there is little evidence that bin Laden wants to be the next caliph (p. 70). However, the oath of allegiance bin Laden demands of al-Qaeda members evokes the oath once paid to a new caliph, a nuance well understood by any committed Islamist (Benjamin and Simon, 104.)

14 Indeed, Benjamin and Simon argue that at first al-Qaeda itself focused on toppling apostate Muslim regimes (p. 103).

15 The authors note that all references to jihad in the most authoritative collections of the prophet Mohammad's sayings portray jihad as warfare and back up their argument; they refer to Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. "Djihad" (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002). Gunaratna (p. 84), as well as Bergen (p. 100), claims that al-Qaeda's interpretation of jihad as "holy war" is mistaken. Both contend that Mohammad himself saw the more important jihad as a battle against one's own evil nature. This more comforting interpretation of jihad as an internal struggle comes from a relatively nonauthoritative collection of the Prophet's sayings (Benjamin and Simon, p. 73).

16 Terrorist groups often see themselves as on the defensive. See David Rapoport, "The Politics of Atrocity," in David Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, eds., Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Pergamon, 1977).

17 Pillar (fn. 12), 67-68.

18 In fact, al-Qaeda regards launching attacks as a goal in and of itself that demonstrates the movement's strength and determination. Bruce Hoffman argues that this perspective is common to religious groups. See Hoffman, "The Modern Terrorist Mindset: Tactics, Targets, and Technologies," in Howard and Sawyer (fn. 3), 83. For an interesting look at religious violence in several different faiths, see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

19 As with many other specific claims, these numbers are unsourced beyond "the CIA."

20 Thomas Wilshere, statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 18, 2001, 7.

21 The text of the president's speech is available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/islam/s092001.htm.

22 See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4 (1980), 434.

21 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, "View of a Changing World" (June 2003), 20. The document is available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/vf_pew_research_global_attitudes_0603.pdf.

24 "Faithful, but Not Fanatics," Economist (June 28, 2003), 50. The article contends that for many who do not share bin Laden's exact ambitions, he has more appeal as a symbol of rebellion than as a model for revolution.

25 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 217. Although Huntington made the term famous, it originally appeared in an essay by Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage,"Atlantic Monthly 266 (September 1990).

26 The most pointed criticism is that Huntington overstates the cohesion of "Islamic civilization" and fails to recognize that Muslim (and Arab) states fight among themselves far more than they do with other civilizations. For an exposition on the diversity of Islam, see Clifford Geertz, "Which Way to Mecca? (Parts I and II)" New York Review of Books 50, nos. 10-11 (June 12, and July 3, 2003). The articles are available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/. Bergen also criticizes this idea, arguing that the "clash of civilizations" is a superficial concept (p. 228).

27 Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 5 (2002), 308. For bin Laden, the clash is not between cultural groups, such as the West, but rather between religious identities.

28 For example, in mid-1996 al-Qaeda's senior military commander, Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri, drowned in Lake Victoria. Al-Qaeda also lost Ali Muhammed, its leading trainer, when he was arrested in September 1998. Another huge blow came that month when German authorities arrested Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a key logistician. Sidi al-Madani al-Tayyib, al-Qaeda chief financial officer, was captured or surrendered to the Saudi government in 1997, and the Saudi regime also arrested three hundred bin Laden supporters in early 1999.

29 G. H. McCormick and G. Owen, "Security and Coordination in a Clandestine Organizational," Mathematical and Computer Modeling, no. 31, 175-92.

30 Hoffman (fn. 18), 84.

31 Its cells in Yemen and Somalia ran operations in Africa, Asia was covered from Malaysia and Indonesia, and so on (Gunaratna, 10).

32 Hoffman (fn. 27), 304. Martha Crenshaw argues that, in general, "terrorists are impatient for action"; Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Howard and Sawyer (fn. 3), 58.

33 For a fascinating account, see Lawrence Wright, "The Man behind Bin Laden," New Yorker, September 16, 2002 (http://www.newyorker.com, accessed on June 11, 2003). For more on the rivalry between the Islamic Group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, see also Anonymous, 174.

34 For example, the Lebanese Hezbollah, while promoting the concept of Islamic unity regardless of nationality, draws primarily on Lebanese Shias. Similarly, the Palestinian group Hamas recruits Palestinians rather than Arab Muslims more broadly.

35 Hoffman (fn. 27), 308.

36 See William F. Weschler, "Follow the Money," Foreign Affairs 80 (July-August 2001); Paul L. Fitzgerald, "Tightening the Screws," National Interest 66 (Winter 2001-2); and Michael Dunn, Middle East Policy 6 (October 1998), 23-28.

37 Malise Ruthven, A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America (New York: Granta Books, 2002), 150.

38 Pillar (fn. 12), 55.

39 Analysts have tended to exaggerate the case with which terrorists could acquire, weaponize, and deliver these weapons in order to kill large numbers. In addition, few terrorist groups are willing to risk the backlash from governments and from potential supporters by using these weapons. Al Qaeda, however, appears to be an exception. See Pillar (fn. 12), 21-24.

40 George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World," February 11, 2003, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/intell/library/reports/2003/dci_speech _02112003.html.

41 See United Nations, "Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001) and Extended by Resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003)."

42 Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran's Crumbling Revolution," Foreign Affairs 82 (January-February 2003).

43 McCormick and Owen (fn. 29), 175 fn. 43.

44 Mueller (fn. 3), 50.

45 I would like to thank David Edelstein for this suggestion.

46 For a strong argument on the counterterrorism expertise of the French intelligence services, see Jeremy Shapiro and Benedicte Suzan, "The French Experience of Counterterrorism," Survival 45 (Spring 2003), 67-98.

47 Pillar (fn. 12), 85.

48 "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World," Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, October 1, 2003), 8.

49 Bruce Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," Atlantic Monthly 29 (June 2003).

[Reference]

Anonymous. Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002, 394 pp.

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002, 490 pp.

Peter L. Berger. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, 303 pp.

Rohan Gunaratna. Inside Al Qaeda. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, 272 pp.

Gilles Kepel. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Translated by Anthony F. Roberts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, 454 pp.

[Author Affiliation]

By DANIEL L. BYMAN*

[Author Affiliation]

* I would like to thank David Edelstein, Bruce Hoffman, Joshua Mitchell, Jeremy Shapiro, Ben Valentino, and John Voll for their comments on previous versions of this draft. This paper also benefited from the comments given at a Georgetown University junior faculty workshop and at a presentation at Columbia University.